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10152013 October 15, 2013

Posted by easterntiger in economic history, economy, financial, gold, markets, silver, stocks.
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Weather Report 10152013

Current Positions  (Changes)

I(Intl) – exit; S(Small Cap) – exit; C(S&P) –exit

F(bonds) – up to 70%; G (money market) – remainder

Weekly Momentum Indicator (WMI) last 4 weeks, thru 10/15/13

+10.74, –4.37, -4.78, +6.25 (S&P100 compared to exactly 3 weeks before***)

(3 Friday’s ago/2 Friday’s ago/Friday – 1 week/today)

Patterns are what I constantly observe.  Beneficial patterns are what I seek to use for my advantage.  Hazardous patterns are what I seek to avoid. Indecisive patterns are treated as hazardous patterns.

Recent patterns have tended toward uncertainty. Here is some proof.

Friday, once again, headlines read this weeks ‘market rally’ as great news, in anticipation of a ‘deal’ on the ‘hill’.  Last month, it ‘rallied’ on the peaceful solution to a Syrian crisis, followed by ‘rallying’ again on the continuation of QE/failure to taper from the Fed.

So many ‘rallies’!!!  What is the net result of all of these ‘rallies’ over time?

I deliberately paused from updates due to the succession of intervening news events, both positive and negative.  Very little has changed. As proof, here were the following measures of key indexes one month after the last report in June and the net change as of Friday.

Index                July 29th            Oct  9th              Friday               Changes

                               1                           2                      3            1to2      1to3

Dow Industrials    15521.97    14802.98     15237.11           -4.63%     -1.84%

S&P100                     756.60         737.29        757.73           -2.55%    +0.15%

S&P500                   1691.65      1656.40      1703.20             -2.08%    +0.68%

Russell 2000          1040.66       1043.46     1084.31            +0.27%    +4.19%

Wilshire 5000            18187.97    17688.15  17871.47         -2.75%     -1.74%

10-year treasury note 2.585%     2.65%        2.682%             +2.51%    +3.75%

The S&P100 is just 9 points higher than it was 5 months ago, at the time of a new ‘all-time high’.

The risk remains higher than the potential reward, in spite of $2-4 billion per day in Fed feeding.

It took above average increases in the past 3 days just to bring several key indexes beyond their levels of July 29th; virtually nowhere in the past 11 weeks.  Even further, the S&P100 was near 547 during an earlier high in mid-May, only 11 points below today’s high.  We are now sitting around 9 points below the highs of the year.

This lack of progress is intentional.  This pattern has every appearance of the year-long ‘tops’ that occurred in 2000 and 2007 before the start of major corrections that resulted in 40% losses in a manner of less than a year.

When you examine the 2000 and 2007 tops (and most market peaks outside of the “V-top” ones like 1987) you’ll notice the churn both before and after what turned out in hindsight to be the final peak. The S&P 500 experienced a correction of more than 10% in Jul-Oct 1999 that was then fully recovered, another 10% correction in Jan-Feb 2000 that was then fully recovered, another 10% correction in March-May 2000 that was fully recovered, and a final high in September after which the S&P 500 was cut in half. Likewise in 2007, a 10% correction in Jul-Aug was fully recovered by the October 9, 2007 peak, and the first 10% correction off the peak was followed by a 7% recovery into December before the market began to decline in earnest. Even then, once the market had lost 20% in March 2008, it mounted a nearly 12% advance by May 2008, as a further loss of more than 50% lay ahead.

https://i1.wp.com/www.prometheusmi.com/images/pages/commentary/images/daily/2013/07/29/sp500_high_risk_periods.png

It was this sort of rolling top, with intermittent corrections being followed by recoveries to yet further marginal highs, that prompted this quote from Barron’s magazine just before the 1969-1970 bear market plunge:

“The failure of the general market to decline during the past year despite its obvious vulnerability, as well as the emergence of new investment characteristics, has caused investors to believe that the U.S. has entered a new investment era to which the old guidelines no longer apply. Many have now come to believe that market risk is no longer a realistic consideration, while the risk of being underinvested or in cash and missing opportunities exceeds any other.”

Investors lose a full-cycle perspective during these periods of enthusiasm. But remember the regularity, worse in the 2008-2009 bear, but consistent throughout history, for typical bear markets to wipe out more than half of the gains from the previous bull market advance (and closer to 85% of the prior gains during “secular” bear phases). Somehow this outcome will be just as great a surprise to investors when the present cycle completes as it has repeatedly been in market cycles throughout history.

Gold

Someone, somewhere is trying to keep the price of gold low.  On Tuesday, October 1st at 2:00 AM EST, it was reported that someone put in an order to sell 800,000 ounces, or about $1 billion worth of gold. The price plunged from $1332/oz to $1293/oz.  Then, on Wednesday, October 9th at 8:40 AM EST, an equally large “market sell” order of 600,000 ounces of gold – valued at $786 million was made.  Then, finally on Thursday, October 10th, again at 8:40 AM EST, with ZERO news other than the poor JPM and WFC earnings, and less progress in the government shutdown/debt ceiling talks than expected – a whopping TWO MILLION OUNCE “market sell” order hit the COMEX, valued at a ridiculous $2.6 BILLION. This suspicious sequence could only have been deliberate deception to create the false impression that other assets are more preferred than gold, in the same way as stock prices have been supported for the past 4 years by the Federal Reserve to make stocks appear to be a preferred asset, in spite of stock prices returning less than 4% of that over the past 14 years of gold/silver returns.  Why would someone want to steer you away from the least promoted, but, best asset class of the past decade, precious metals, while also attempt to encourage you to stay invested in one of the most publicized, but, weakest class, stocks?  After all, gold and silver are real, but, stocks are paper.

Interest Rates

My over-weighting of the F fund is to anticipate the ‘flight to safety’ that normally occurs during periods of stock weakness and surrounding periods of financial stress.  The threat of either a credit downgrade, a debt ceiling fight, or default all play into the hands of a desire for a reduction in risk, and a desire for protection that higher bond prices offer.  The false expectation of a summer stock swoon was the purpose for weighting in F earlier in the year.  The Fed’s May pre-announcement of expected tapering in September offset that expectation and drove bond prices and the F fun to a slightly lower bottom.  That bottom has firmed over the past 4 months, along with the corresponding ceiling on interest rates.  In spite of the hysteria and anxiety of higher rate expectations, rates today are no higher than they were almost 4  months ago.

Near panic continued to rule the interest rate picture since that premature, ‘pre-taper’ announcement from the Fed in May. Rates on the 10-year Treasury note ultimately rose from a low of 1.6% on April 16th, completing practically 90% of it’s final rise within 9 weeks.  Nevertheless, the media flooded the air with scare stories about rapidly rising interest rates, when not viewing the context that the highs of this year were lower the lows of 4 & 5 years ago.  Rates actually rose only a average of 0.00106 points per day between June 24th and September 25th.  Between August 19th and September 16th, this rate rose less than 3% of the rate from the April low to the ultimate high of 2.984% on September 6th.  Overall, rates continue to rise and fall within a declining channel, just as they have for the past 30 years.  Much of the concern in the past few months on rate increases appeared to be psychological.

The de-emphasis of tapering, reducing the $85 billion purchase of mortgages backed securities by the Fed,has extended the impression of downward Fed pressure on rates.  This reversed much of the losses incurred in the F fund during the mini-rate ‘panic’ of May/June.

However, within the past week, world reaction has responded to the stalemate in Washington, by moving from short term treasuries, such as this 1-month note, and into longer term notes, given the increases in risk associated with the now increasing probability of a debt payment being missed, if there is no prompt action on the debt ceiling.  News stories or politicians who suggest a lower level of concern on the debt ceiling, citing the $250 billion dollars in collections versus $20 billion dollars in payment due, fail to account for the rest of the balances planned against the collections, spread through thousands of obligations worldwide.

Simply ‘prioritizing’ these obligations within the current limit would immediately create an actual elevated risk, removing the universally accepted ‘risk-free’ aspect of US government debt, and immediately raise interest rates. The impact would ripple instantly through any interest rate sensitive activities, such as housing, construction, real estate, lending, leveraged instruments, etc., and further into retail, travel, and on.  The fragile state of economic stability would rattle any buffer that currently exists between the current state and an actual recession, as measured by lower levels of economic output and/or growth.  Already, the costs of insuring U. S. government bonds has risen to levels not seen in five years.  This insurance is a premium paid against the probability of default.  We might not believe that a default will occur, but, this doesn’t stop others around the world from preparing for the unlikely event anyway.

This short-term rate increase is only one of several signs that threaten to undermine this fragile stability, already supported only by heavy subsidies by the Fed from QE.  This indicates fear in the short-term borrowing markets that even the hint of a default will cause too much demand for overnight funds than the supply at a given price will allow.

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